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This paper  analyzes  the  optimal  investment  decisions  of  insured 
banks under  fixed-rate deposit  insurance.  In the presence  of charter 
value,  trade-offs exist between preserving  the charter and exploiting 
deposit  insurance.  Allowing  banks  to  dynamically revise  their asset 
portfolios has a significant impact on both the investment decisions and 
the fair cost of deposit insurance.  The optimal bank portfolio problem 
can  be  solved  analytically  for  constant  charter  value.  The 
corresponding deposit insurance is shown to be a put option that matures 
sooner than the audit  date.  An efficient numerical procedure  is also 
developed to handle more general situations. 
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The current system  of fixed-rate deposit  insurance  in  the  United 
States gives insured banks the incentive to  take on riskier investments 
than they otherwise would.  To relate the cost of deposit insurance to 
a bank's  investment risk, Merton  (1977) shows that  deposit  insurance 
grants a put option to the insured bank.  Under this model, banks tend 
to  take on extremely risky projects to  exploit  the  put  option.  As a 
result,  fixed-rate  deposit  insurance  is  apt  to  be  underpriced  for 
high-risk-taking  banks  and  overpriced  for  low-risk-taking  banks. 
Implementation of  option models  for valuing  deposit  insurance can be 
found in Marcus and Shaked (1984) and ROM  and Verma (1986). 
In reality, not all banks take extreme risks.  Being in business is 
a privilege and is reflected in a firm's  charter value or growth option. 
Extreme risk-taking may  lead a bank  into insolvency, forcing it  out of 
business by regulators.  The charter value comes from many sources, such 
as monopoly  rents  in issuing deposits, economies  of  scale, superior 
information in the financial markets, and reputation. 
Taking  into  account  the  charter value, Marcus  (1984) shows that 
banks either minimize or maximize their risk exposure as  a result of the 
trade-offs between the put option value and the charter value.  Under a 
different setting,  Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) show that the trade-offs 
reestablish an  interior  solution to  the  capital  structure decision. 
They also argue that capital requirements  and other regulations serve as 
additional implicit constraints to discourage extreme risk-taking. 
Almost  all  models  of deposit insurance assume that  banks'  asset 
risk  is exogenously given.  With  the  exception  of  the  discussion  in 
Ritchken et al.  (19911, the flexibility for banks to dynamically adjust 
their  investment decisions has  been  mostly  ignored.  However,  their 
model allows only a finite number of portfolio revisions between audits. 
In this paper, I establish a continuous-trading model  to identify 
how an equity-maximizing bank dynamically responds to flat-rate deposit 
insurance schemes and  how  this affects the  actuarially fair value  of 
deposit  insurance.  Since  investment  decisions  are  carried  out  by 
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control of a diffusion process.  Upon obtaining the optimal portfolio, 
the actuarially fair cost of insurance can be easily calculated. 
In this model,  I use the traditional dynamic programming approach 
(Fleming and Rishel  [I9751  1.  The disadvantage of this approach is that 
it  often  reduces  the  problem  to  an intractable partial  differential 
equation  (PDE) where  analytical  soiutions are rare.  Merton*  s  (1971 
application  to  the  optimal  consumption  problem  is  among  the  few 
cases in which analytical solutions are obtained.  Fortunately, in this 
problem  the resulting PDE can be  explicitly solved provided  that  the 
charter value  is  constant.  Even  though  I assume  lognormal price  to 
warrant  an  analytical  solution,  general  price  distributions  can  be 
easily built into the model. 
The  dynamic  programming  procedure  can  also  be  carried  out 
numerically by  lattice approximation.  This  is  especially attractive 
when  more  realistic  assumptions are made.  As  the  bank  changes  its 
portfolio risk over time, the most  common binomial model  is no longer 
path-independent, and  the  problem  size  grows  exponentially  with  the 
number of partitions.  This difficulty is resolved by using a trinomial 
lattice.  The lattice is set up in such a way that the decision variable 
is incorporated into the transition probabilities rather than into the 
step size. 
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2  formulates the model 
and  summarizes  the  results under  no  portfolio  revision.  Section 3 
solves  the  optimal  portfolio  problem  under  continuous  portfolio 
revision.  The  value  of  deposit  insurance  is  derived  based  on  the 
optimal  portfolio  decisions.  Section  4  presents  the  trinomial 
approximation of  controlled diffusion process.  Section 5  extends the 
model  to  more  general  situations, and  section 6  concludes the paper. 
The proof of the main results can be found in the appendix. 
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Investment Opportunities:  Assume  that  financial markets are complete. 
The  bank  can  invest  in  both  riskless  bonds  (earning rate  r)  and  a 
portfolio of risky securities that follows a geometric Wiener process 
Capital  and  Liability:  The  bank's  initial  asset  X(0)  consists  of 
capital K(O1  and  deposit base D(0).  For simplicity,  I  asshe no net 
external cash inflows into the deposit base, no capital injections, and 
no  dividend  payments  during  the  time  interval  [O,TI.  Because  all 
deposits are insured, I assume that deposits earn the riskless rate r. 
Let L(t1 be the liability at time t; then 
Investment Decisions:  Management decides at  time zero to put a fraction 
q of its assets in risky securities and the remaining in riskless bonds. 
Without portfolio revision, q is fixed before the audit. 
The market value of the assets at time t is 
where  is  the  standard  normal  random  variable  with  density  and 
distribution function n0  and NO,  respectively. 
Auditing and Closure Rules:  The regulator conducts an audit at time T: 
If  the bank is solvent, i.e.,  the market value of its assets exceeds its 
liabilities, it  claims the residual X(T) - L(T)  and keeps its charter. 
If  the bank  is  insolvent, the  regulator takes over  and  equityholders 
receive nothing.  Let C(T1 represent the charter value of a solvent bank 
at  time  T.  C(T)  is  assumed  to  be  a  constant  fraction  of  total 
liabilities.  Define 
C(t) = fL(t),  0  <  f <  1. 
Let V(t;ql be the equity value at  time t under policy q.  Then 
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VT  = {  (5) 
0  otherwise. 
The  equity value  at  time 0  can be  obtained  by  using  standard  option 
pricing  techniques, 
t 
qX(OIN(dl)-[L(O)-C(0)-(1-q)X(0)1N(d2)  if  (l-q)X(O)<L(O) 
V(0.q)  =  (6  1 
X(0)-L(O)+G(O)  otherwise  , 
where 
On behalf of the shareholders, management will maximize the equity 
value by choosing the optimal fraction q* such that 
V(O,q*) = max {  V(0,q)  I. 
9 
(7 
This optimization problem can be  solved analytically.  Solvent and 
insolvent  banks  are  treated  separately.  Even  though  an  initially 
insolvent bank would be an unusual case, it  is included to complete the 
analysis.  I summarize these results in theorems 1 and 2. 
Theorem 1.  For an insolvent bank without portfolio revisions, q* =  1 is 
optimal.  Consequently, the value of the deposit insurance1 is 
where 
The value of deposit insurance always refers to the actuarially fair 
cost of deposit insurance. 
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policy is 
where 
Consequently, the value of deposit insurance is 
Theorems 1 and 2 show that without  revision opportunities between 
audits, banks always take extreme positions.  Regardless of the charter 
value, an  insolvent  bank  always takes the riskiest position.  With  a 
small charter value,  a solvent  bank  may  be  better  off  by  taking  the 
riskiest position so as to maximize the value of the deposit  insurance. 
Only solvent banks with a sufficiently large capital-deposit ratio m or 
a relatively high charter value will  invest in fiskless  bonds. 
2 
The value of insurance for an insolvent bank, or for a solvent bank 
with f <  1 -  H(m1,  is the same as in Merton  (1977) where  the charter 
value is zero.  When f 2  1 - H(m),  risk-taking  is discouraged and the 
J  insurance has no intrinsic value. 
This can be shown from the fact that H(m1  is an increasing function 
of m with H(-1) = 0  and H(m) =  1. 
To be precise, when f  =  1 - H(m1, a bank is indifferent between q = 0 
(preserving  the charter) and q =  1 (exploiting  the insurance).  However, 
the bank's  actual decision on q does affect  the  value  of  insurance. 
This discontinuity  in  the insurance value  is  one of  the drawbacks of 
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In  this section,  I  assume  that banks can revise  their  investment 
portfolios continuously over  time at  no cost.  Let  X(t) be  the market 
value of the assets and q = q(t,X(t)) be  the fraction of risky assets in 
the portfolio at  time t E  [O,Tl.  Then X(t) follows a diffusion process 
where  V(t)  is  a  standard Brownian motion.  The  liability and  charter 
value are given by  equations (2) and  (41, respectively.  For valuation 
purposes, one can substitute p  with r in equation (11).  Let J(t,X(t)) 
be  the maximum equity value of the bank at time t.  Then 
J(t,X(t)) = max Et  [J(TnXT)e 
-r (T-t  1 I. 
'I  (12) 
It  has the boundary condition 
X(T) - L(T) +  C(T)  if X(T) 2  L(T) 
J(T.X(T)  = {  (13) 
0  otherwise. 
We  are  interested  in  the maximum  equity  value  J(O,X(O))  for any 
given X(O1  = Xo at  time zero and the corresponding optimal policy qf(t) 
for all t E  [O,Tl.  This problem is solved by  using dynamic programing. 
The results are presented in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.  Let 7  be the solution of the following equation4 
Suppose the asset  value at  time  t  is X(t).  Under  the assumptions of 
section 2 and continuous portfolio revision, the optimal decision q*(t) 
and the corresponding equity value J(t,X(t)) are as follows. 
static models. 
4  If  the solution is negative, simply let 7  = 0. 
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(21  If t E [r,TI  and X(t) <  L(t1, then q*(tl =  1, and 
where 
ln[X(t)/L(t)l + cr2(~-t1/2  r1  =  m 
31 If t E [O.t), then $(t)  =  1, and 
C(t) X~N-  +  L(~)N(T~.-~~.P)I  J(t.X(t))  = 
+ X(t1N(r31 -  [L(t1-C(t)lN(r4) 
where 
and  N(x,y,pI  is  the  standard  cumulative  bivariate  normal 
distribution with correlation coefficient p. 
5  In summary, the optimal policy is 
if t E [T,T)  and X(t1 r  L(t1 
q* ;to 
1  if  t e [O,r1  or X(t1 <  L(t1. 
Theorem 3 clearly illustrates the trade-offs between preserving the 
-  - 
Actually, when t E [t,T1  and  ~(t)  >  ~(t),  any q is optimal as long as 
q is set at 0 when X(t1 hits the solvency curve ~(t1. 
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essentially a put option on the bank's  assets that matures at  the time 
of the audit.  The longer the time before an audit, the higher the value 
of  the deposit  insurance.  Prior to  time r, the deposit  insurance is 
more valuable than the fixed charter value, and shareholders exploit the 
deposit insurance by  choosing q =  1.  After time r,  since the audit is 
near,  the  deposit  insurance  is  less  valuable  than  the  charter,  and 
shareholders will do their best  to ensure that the market value of the 
bank's assets remains above the solvency curve L(t)  in order to preserve 
its charter.  Figure 1 shows this optimal policy where the riskless rate 
is set to zero. 
1 
X(t)  (Asset Value) 
Figure 1.  Optimal Portfolio Policies 
-- 
The critical time r is uniquely determined by equation (14) for any 
0  a f  s  1.  To see this, rewrite equation (14) with 13  = 6/2: 
Since the left-hand side of (18) decreases from +a,  to 1 as  /3  goes from 0 




I  (Time  -  >  t 
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the riskless interest rate r nor the banks'  capital-deposit ratio m. 
As an example, consider an audit period of one year.  Suppose the 
volatility  of  the  risky  assets  is  c =  10  percent  annually,  and  the 
charter value is f =  10 percent  of the deposit base.  Solving equation 
(14) yields r =  0.293.  If  f drops to 5 percent, r  will  increase to 
0.834.  If there is no charter at  all, r equals T, the audit date. 
To obtain the value of  the deposit  insurance I(O1,  note  that  the 
equity value  comes from  three  sources:  namely,  the  initial  capital 
K(O),  the deposit  insurance I(O1, and the charter value C(O1.  That is, 
where P{X(T)kL[T))  is the probability that  the bank  passes  the audit. 
Following the same argument as in the proof of theorem 3, we have 
where  the  7's  are  evaluated  at  time  t =  0.  Substituting  this  into 
equation (191,  we have the actuarially fair value of deposit  insurance 
for a bank with continuous revision opportunities 
where 7 and 7  are evaluated at  time t = 0. 
3  4 
This insurance value can be  viewed  as a put  option on the bank's 
assets with maturity r  instead of T.  This clearly explains the impact 
of the charter value and the continuous portfolio revision on the value 
of  deposit  insurance.  Since +  <  T as  long  as  f >  0,  the  deposit 
insurance is less valuable in the presence of  charter value.  Compared 
to the static model, the insurance value in equation (20) is continuous 
in terms of charter value and capital-asset ratio.  Even for very highly 
capitalized banks, as long as r  >  0, the insurance has a positive value. 
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For  general  terminal  payoff  functions  other  than  the  one  in 
equation (51,  analytical solutions may not always exist, and numerical 
procedures must be used to solve the optimal portfolio problem.  Without 
portfolio revisions, a simple binomial model can be used to approximate 
the bank's  asset value.  However, when the portfolio  is revised, the 
resulting  lattice  becomes path-dependent. 
To see this, partition the audit period  [O,Tl into n subintervals 
of equal length h = T/n.  The asset portfolio may be revised at discrete 
decision points tl=  ih, i = O,l,  ...,  n-1.  Let q(tl,X(tl))  be the revised 
fraction of risky  investments at  time  t  if  the  market  value  of  the 
1 
bank's  assets is X(tl).  Let q be initially set to qo.  The portfolio is 
revised at time tl by changing qo to ql at the up state and q2 at the 
down state, respectively.  The two-period binomial lattice looks like 
where 
for i = 0,1,2. Obviously, if uod1  #  dou2, the lattice is path-dependent. 
To overcome this difficulty, a path-independent  lattice is first 
set up as if there is no portfolio revision.  Then, when the portfolio 
is revised to a new q value at a revision point, one changes only the 
transition probabilities such that the  drift and  variance  terms match 
locally.  This  suggests  adding  one  more  degree  of  freedom  to  the 
lattice.  Consider the following trinomial lattice when the asset value 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmat time tl  is XI: 
The transition probabilities are set to 
Obviously, zJ pJ =  1.  The first and second local moments are 
As h -+  0, these moments converge to the true mean and variance of the 
diffusion  process  X(t)  in  equation  (11).  This  ensures  that  the 
trinomial process converges to the process X(t1  in distribution. 
To find the optimal policy q*, a dynamic programming procedure can 
be  applied  to  the  trinomial  lattice.  At  the  very  end-nodes', payoff 
values are given.  Working backward, at any node X  an optimal policy 
1  * 
q;(h)  and equity value can be easily obtained.  Under certain smoothness 
conditions on the payoff function,  as h +  0, q;(hl  will converge to the 
optimal  policy  q*.  The  optimal  policy  of  theorem  3 can  be  easily 
confirmed using this procedure. 
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In sections 2 and 3, we adopted Marcus's  (1984) specification of 
the charter value.  The bank either retains or loses the full charter 
value depending on whether or not it  is solvent at  the audit date.  This 
corresponds to  the  terminal payoff  curve OBCD  in figure 2.  However, 
despite its simplicity, this specification is far from realistic. 
For  example,  regulators may,  for  economic or  political  reasons, 
choose to inJect additional funds into a slightly insolvent bank  rather 
than simply to close it.  Thus, the payoff curve OBCD in figure 2  should 
stretch farther to the left.  As for the equityholders,  if  the market 
value of the bank's  assets is below the liability value Just before the 
audit, it would be to the bank's  advantage to inject additional funds in 
order  to preserve  the charter.  It  may  do  so as  long as  the charter 
value exceeds the liability minus asset value.  This suggests the payoff 
curve OAD of a call option with strike price L(T1 - CCT).  In this case, 
the charter can be viewed as part of the bank's  tangible assets. 
However, when a bank is close to insolvency, it  may face financial 
distress or bankruptcy costs, which would  decrease the  charter value. 
Usually  the charter value depends not only on the size of the deposit 
base, but also on the soundness of the bank (such  as the capital-deposit 
ratio).  When this ratio drops below a certain level, a regulatory tax 
is  likely to be  charged  (Buser, Chen, and Kane  [I9811  1.  Therefore, a 
more reasonable payoff function would be somewhat like the OEFD curve in 
figure  2.  For  a  highly  capitalized  bank,  the  charter  value  is 
proportional to the deposit base  (the  F-D segment).  As the bank lowers 
its capital, the charter-deposit ratio decreases  (the E-F  segment).  If 
the capital is too low, the charter value is zero (the  O-E segment). 
After  the  payoff  curve  is  specified,  we  can  use  the  trinomial 
approximation of section 4  to calculate the present value of bank equity 
and the actuarially fair price of deposit insurance.  For demonstration 
purposes, suppose the payoff curve has the following form: 
if K(T) r  0 
V(T) =  (24  1 
otherwise, 
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This payoff function contains many interesting special cases.  When 
f = 0,  it reduces to the case of Merton (19771.  When 8 = ioo  and a <  +cv, 
it reduces the OAD curve in figure 3 where an insolvent bank can inJect 
additional funds at no extra cost in order to retain its charter.  When 
a =  +OD and  8  <  +a,  it  reduces  to  that  of  Marcus  (19841, which 
corresponds to the OBCD payoff curve in figure 2. 
V(T1  (Equity Value) 
Figure 2.  Alternative Payoff Functions 
Figure 3 shows the payoff function (241 for a =  1, 2, 4 and  oo, 
while 8 =  1.  The corresponding optimal policies are shown in figure 4, 
where the other parameters are T =  1, r =  0,  Xo = Lo =  100,  CT  = 0.1, and 
f = 0.05.  All of the optimal policies are similar to the one in theorem 
3.  Banks initially choose q =  1.  After a critical time r, there is a 
critical curve K(t1.  If  asset value X(t1  is above K(t),  q =  0 is 
optimal;  otherwise q =  1 is optimal.  In contrast to  theorem 3,  the 
critical curve K(t1 is no longer a straight line.  It is interesting to 
note that  the  larger the value of a, the  larger  the critical time r, 
because the charter value erodes faster as  a increases. 
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Figure 3.  Some Specific Payoff Functions 
T 
X(t1  (Asset Value) 
Figure 4.  Optimal Policies Under the Payoff Functions in Figure 3 
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This  paper  develops  a  stochastic  control  model  to  analyze  the 
investment decisions of a bank whose deposits are fully insured under a 
fixed-rate insurance premium.  I show how banks dynamically adjust their 
investment portfolios in  response  to  market  information and  how  this 
flexibility affects both investment decisions and  the value of deposit 
insurance.  The  optimal  portfolio  problem  is  solved  analytically 
assuming lognormal asset price and constant charter value.  For general 
payoff patterns, an efficient numerical procedure is presented. 
Under  continuous  portfolio  revision  I  show  that,  before  some 
critical time T,  the bank always takes the riskiest position regardless 
of  its solvency situation.  The bank  may  act  cautiously only  between 
time r and the audit date T.  The value of deposit  insurance remains a 
put  option, but  with maturity  r  instead  of T.  This critical  time r 
depends on the charter value, on the volatility of the risky assets, and 
on the time between audits.  This gives the regulators some guidelines, 
at least in theory, on the timing of audits. 
The major  limitation of this model  is the empirical difficulty in 
specifying  the  charter value.  This  is  further complicated  by  other 
factors such as transaction costs, asymmetric information, reputation, 
and economic conditions. 
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Proof of Theorem 1.  Since X(0) <  L(O), from equation (6)  we have 
The equity value V  is increasing in q; q* =  1 is optimal.  Q.  E.  D. 
Proof of Theorem 2.  For a solvent bank, when q S  qmln=  1  L(O)/X(O), 
the riskless bonds alone will  be  enough to  pay  off  the obligation at 
time T, and the bank will pass the audit with certainty.  In this case, 
V(0.q) = X(0) -  [L(O) - G(011. 
When q >  qmin,  1.e.. LO-1-0  >  0, we have 
Hence, the equity value V(0,q) is flat on interval  [O, qmin]  and convex 
on interval  [qmln,  11.  The optimal policy q* is either 1 or any value 
in [O,qml,l.  Therefore, from equations (6)  and (7) 
v(o,q*) = max {  V(0,0), V(0,1) ) 
This leads to equation (10).  Q.  E.  D. 
To  prove  theorem 3, a few  lemma  are  necessary.  Lemma  1  is  an 
adaptation of Fleming and Rishel (1975,  p.  124, theorem V.S.l).  Lemma 2 
is a classic result  (Bhattacharya and Waymire  [1990, p.  321).  In the 
rest of the proof,  I use the shorthand notations J and f for J(t  ,X(t  1) 
and f(s;t,X(t)), respectively, as long as no confusion arises. 
Leuma  1.  (Sufficient optimality  condition for  discounted  stochastic 
dynamic programming)  Let X(t)  be a diffusion process on [O,Tl 
(A.  1) 
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Let U(t,X) and  J(T,X) be continuous and  satisfy the polynomial growth 
condition.  Let  J(t,X) be  the  solution  of  the  dynamic  programming 
equation 
1 
rJ = max (Jt +  p(X)Jx + z(c(~))2~,  +  H(t,X))  (A.  2) 
with boundary value J(T,X(T)).  If J(.t,X) is twice differentiable for 
t  E  [O,T) and continuous for t  E  [O,Tl, then 
(A.  3) 
for any admissible policy q. 
Lema  2.  Let X(t1 be a Brownian motion with drift p.  Let T  be  the 
Z 
first time the process reaches level z  conditioned on X(0) =  x.  Then 
the probability density and distribution functions of T  are 
z 
(  z-x-pt  1 
2 
f(t;x,z)  =  (z-x)  expl-  I  t >  0,  (A. 4) 
fic t 3'2  2c2  t 
Lema 3.  The functional  J(t,X(t))  and the policy q* defined in theorem 
3  is optimal if 
(1)  when Jxx is continuous at (t.X(t)),  the maximizing q  is 
(A.  6) 
and 
2  rJ = Jt+ rX(t)Jx  + f(cx(t))  Jxx  if q*  =  1  (A.  7) 
rJ = Jt+ rX(t)Jx  if q*  =  0  (A.  8) 
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q* = 0 
where 
(A.  9a) 
(A.  9b) 
Proof:  Part  (1)  follows immediately from lemma 1 with p(X) =  rX.  To 
show part  (21,  note that J(t,X(t)) is twice differentiable except when 
X(t) = L(t) and t E  (*,TI where J;  >  J; =  1 and J;  = J'  = 0; when t E 
XX 
(r,TI,  J(t,X(t))  is convex for X(t) s L(t) and  linear for X(t) r  L(t) 
(see the proof of theorem 3).  To apply lemma 1, add a smoothing term P' 
to  J  such  that  JE(t,~(t))  =  J(t,X(t))  +  ~'(t,~(t))  is  twice 
differentiable, convex for X(t) 5 L(t), and concave for X(t) iz  L(t) for 
& 
t  E  (z,T)  and  for any small number E  >  0.  For example, one such P  is 
AJL 
( -&n7  if X(t)>L(t)+cn  and t~(7.T) 
X(t1-L(t)  AP  pC  = {  -rx(t)-L(t)+rin(  &  c  I  if OsX(t)-L(t)sen and t~(r.7') 
I0  otherwise, 
where bf  =  J'(L(~)) - J;(L(~)). Define 
X 
~(P'I  = - rpC +  P:+  ~x(~IP:. 
Then for any admissible policy q, 
-rJC +  J:  +  r~(t)J:  +  &(q~(tlo)2JLx'x  - #(f  1 
s - rJC + J:  +  r~(t)J:  +  &(q*~(t  )o12fx - #(f  1 
where q* is the policy in theorem 3.  Therefore,  JE(t,~(t))  = J(t,X(t)) 
+  pE(t  ,X(t  1)  is the solution of the dynamic programming equation 
&  rJC = max [Jt  +  rx(t)J:  +  k(q~(t  )ol2.fX  - #(pF)] 
q 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfor t E (r,T-6)  and any small number 6 >  0.  Applying lemma 1, we have 
Let  e.6 +  0.  .  The last  three terms on the right-hand  side all go to 
zero.  Then J(t,X(t)) k E  [J(T,X(T))I for any q.  This implies J(t,X(t)l 
*  q 
and q-  are optimal.  Q.  E.  D. 
Proof of Theorem 3.  We need to show that the given functional  J(t,X(t)) 
and the corresponding  policy q*  satisfy the conditions in lemma 3. 
Case 1.  Let  t  E (r,T1 and X(t) k L(t1.  When X(t1  >  L(t), q*(t) = 
0 and J(t,X(t))  in  equation  (15)  together satisfy the conditions (A.6) 
and  (A.8) in  lemma 3.  When X(t) =  L(t), as we will  show later, J  is 
X 
not  continuous in X(t).  However, from lemma 3, q  =  0 is optimal if J: 
< J;.  Since J:  = 1, we need only to show that J- >  1 at  X(t) = L(t). 
X 
First note that J(t,X(t))  is continuous at  X(t) =  L(t).  In fact, 
as X(t)?~(t), rl+  - fi/2  and r2+  fi/2  in equation (16).  Further 
manipulation yields J(t,X(t))  + G(t)  =  J(t,X(t)).  Now  differentiate 
J(t,X(t))  in equation (161, and  let  ~(t)?~(t).  Then 
(A.  10) 
Since a~-/at = - 
X  C(t)  n(m/2)  <  0, J- is strictly increasing in  t.  in7  c(~-t  l3I2  x 
Noting that J- =  1 at  t  =r,  we have J- >  1 for all  t  E (=,TI. 
X  X 
Case  2.  Let  t  E  (r,Tl, X(t)  <  L(t).  Differentiating equation 
(16). and noting that X(t)n(rl) = L(t)n(r2),  we have 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(A.  11) 
J  is obviously continuous.  To show that q (t) =  1 is optimal, we need 
XX 
only to check that condition (A.7) in lemma 3 is satisfied.  Toward this 
goal, let Y(t) =  ln[X(t)l  - rt; then 
The first passage times are the same for the geometric Wiener  process 
X(t) to reach L(s) given X(t) at time t  and for the Brownian motion Y(t) 
to reach ln[L(s)l  - rs given Y(t) =  lnX(t) - rt  at  time t.  From lemma 
2, the density function of this first passage time is 
It  is easy to show that J(t,X(t))  =  C(t)f(s;t,X(t))ds.  Since the  c 
density function f satisfies the backward Kolmogorov equation 
(A.  12) 
condition (A.7) can be easily checked: 
=  -rC(t)  fds +  [rC(tI  fds +  G(t)  ftds] 
Jt  Jt  Jt 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmCase 3.  Let t  E  [O,T].  We first show that J(t,X(t))  in equation 
(17) is the risk-neutral value of a contingent claim with terminal value 
J(r,X(r))  at time 7.  To see this, let 
(A. 13) 
2  1/2 
where X(T)  =  X(t)e  (ru 12)  (7-t)W(7-t)  Substltutlng  equations  (15) 
and  (16)  into (A.13). 
where rl  and 7  are evaluated at 7  rather than at  t.  Carrying out the 
2 
integrations above gives equation (17).  From (A.13)  we have 
2 
-2  /2 
1  -(~(t)o)~~~~(t,~(t))=  2  e  -r (7-t)  cm  ~[X(T)CI~J~~(T,X(T)  I -  e  dz. 
6 
Since J  (r,X(r))  r  0  from cases 1 and 2,  Jxx(t,X(t))  r  0. 
XX 
Now we need only to check condition (A.7)  in order to show q (t)  = 
1  is optimal.  Let p  =  p(r,y;t,X(t))  be  the  density function of  the 
lognormal price X(r) conditioned on X(t).  Rewrite equation (17) as 
~(t,x(t))  =  e  -r (7-t)  ~(T,Y)P(T,Y;  f ,X(t  1 My-  (A. 14) 
Then equation  (A.7)  can be  established  by  the fact  that p(-c,y;t,X(t)) 
satisfies the backward Kolmogorov equation (A.10).  Q.E.D. 
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